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Codes (ROSC). It benchmarks the listed sector’s observance of corporate governance against the
OECD Principles of Corporate Governance and is based on a template developed by the World
Bank. This assessment was undertaken by Behdad Nowroozi from the East Asia and Pacific
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assessment was cleared for publication by the Ministry of Finance in August 2003. 
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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 
Since 1998, Korea has taken important steps to address the weaknesses that contributed to the 
economic crisis of 1997. The corporate governance framework has been strengthened 
significantly. The reform agenda, however, remains unfinished and the equity markets relative to 
other OECD countries remain underdeveloped.1  
There has been good progress in upgrading accounting and auditing standards and practices, as 
well as strengthening underlying institutions responsible for setting standards and ensuring 
compliance.2 The Financial Supervisory Commission/Financial Supervisory Services have been 
established, and the role of the Korean Institute of Certified Public Accountants has been 
strengthened.3 While significant improvement has been made, efforts should continue to further 
improve accounting standards and improve accounting and auditing practices. 
Large listed companies have been required to establish audit committees of the boards of 
directors. However, the concept is new and audit committees are generally perceived to be 
neither effective nor adequately equipped to effectively discharge their oversight responsibilities. 
Efforts should continue to improve the effectiveness of audit committees, including measures to 
clarify and strengthen the role and function of audit committees consistent with international best 
practices; replace statutory auditors with audit committees for smaller companies over time4; and 
upgrade the skills and knowledge of audit committee members. While holding companies are 
allowed, only several of them have been established. In order to improve transparency and 
disclosures of chaebol-affiliated operations, several measures could be considered, including 
measures that may change the incentives for large chaebol to establish holding companies (e.g. 
lower taxes). 
While significant improvements have been made to increase minority shareholder rights (e.g., by 
lowering or eliminating threshold ownership requirements) and the ease with which shareholders 
exercise those rights, further improvements are required. These could include measures to further 
enhance shareholder rights and to change incentives in order to make cumulative voting more 
appealing for large listed companies as a means of allowing minority shareholders a greater 
voice in the selection of directors (where a certain percentage of shareholders request it). 
Additionally, further steps should be taken to improve the process for nomination of independent 
directors by, for instance, requiring that at least two-thirds of members of nomination committees 
be independent directors. 
While derivative actions are allowed, these are costly and therefore have been limited so far to 
                                                          
1 In OECD countries, market capitalization has risen from 50 percent of GDP in 1990 to 131 percent in 1999 before falling 
somewhat during 2000. In contrast, its share in Korea was 32 percent in year 2000, lower than a decade ago. 
2 The KASB was established in 1999. Since its estblishment, it has promulgated ten accounting standards in the form of 
statements, and several interpretations. Additionally, KASB has published eight exposure drafts, and three preliminary draft 
standards, as of April 2003. 
3 KICPA is in the process of adopting a revised code of ethics and a comprehensive Continuing Professional Education (CPE) 
program. Additionally, in the year 2002, more than 2000 auidtors have received training on various accounting and auidting 
topics. 
4 Under the SEA, establishment of an audit commiittee is mandatory for listed companies with assets of at least 2 trillion Won. 
As of Decmber 31, 2001 only 12 percent of listed firms had set up an audit commiittee. 
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only a few.5 The redress available to shareholders if their rights are violated remains limited. 
There is no cost-effective way for shareholders to seek redress. The draft law submitted to the 
National Assembly to allow class action lawsuits should be enacted as soon as possible. 
Securities laws have been amended to require listed companies to have outside directors. 
However, the concept of independent (outside) directors is new and still not well rooted in 
Korea.6 Additional efforts could include measures to expand the fiduciary duty of directors to 
shareholders and make it explicit under the law, and to limit liability of independent directors in 
cases in which they have acted in good faith. 
While formal corporate governance rules may not now be substantially different from other 
OECD countries, corporate governance practices often fall short of the spirit, if not the letter, of 
the OECD principles. The challenge now lies in implementation and effective enforcement of 
legislative changes to improve the corporate culture and practices.  
I. CAPITAL MARKET OVEVIEW AND INSTITUTIONAL FRAMEWORK 
As of December 2001, the total market capitalization of listed firms on the Korea Stock 
Exchange (KSE) amounted to about 256 trillion Won--about 49.5 percent of the country’s GDP 
(517 trillion Won). The turnover ratio in 2001 was 599 percent, up from 97.2 percent in 1996. 
The total trading volume of stocks in the KSE was 116,417 million shares. Free float estimates 
are not available. Although functionally not distinguishable, the KOSDAQ stock market is 
primarily designed for smaller and younger technology oriented firms. The KOSDAQ is much 
smaller than the KSE about one-fifth the size of the KSE. As of 2001, the number of shares 
registed with the KOSDAQ market was 8.4 billion, and its total market capitalizaiton was 51.8 
trillion Won, about 10 percent of the country’s GDP (as of 2001).  
The principal law governing stock corporations is the Commercial Code (CC), and the principal 
law governing the stock markets is the Securities and Exchange Act (SEA). The SEA contains a 
number of special rules applicable to listed firms. The SEA is implemented by the Financial 
Supervisory Commission (FSC) with the help of its executive body, the Financial Supervisory 
Service (FSS). Established in April 1998, the FSC is a consolidated supervisory organization 
covering the entire financial sector, including banking, securities, and insurance. In addition, a 
separate commission, the Securities & Futures Commission (SFC), was established under the 
FSC for monitoring the securities and futures market. The KSE is a self-regulatory organization. 
The Korea Securities Dealers Association (KSDA) is a self-regulatory organization under the 
SEA composed of securities brokers. The KSDA has, in principle, power to enforce self-
regulatory rules such as the Fair Practice Rules and the Regulation on the KOSDAQ stock 
market.  
II. REVIEW OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE PRINCIPLES 
This review assesses the compliance of Korea to each OECD Principle of Corporate Governance. 
Each statement is given a benchmark, based upon the country’s level of observance of the 
                                                          
5 Under the CC and SEA, if a shareholder wins a derivative suit, s/he has the right to demand reimbursement from the company 
for the action cost and a reasonable amount of other expenses incurred in the course of action. 
6 In order to help train directors, the Korea Institute of Directors was established in November 2002. Other institutions have also 
been etsablished recently to train directors and conduct resaerch. 
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principle.7  
Section I: The Right of Shareholders 
Principle IA. The corporate governance framework should protect shareholders’ rights. Basic shareholder rights 
include the right to: (1) Secure methods of ownership registration; (2) Convey or transfer shares; (3) Obtain relevant 
information on the corporation on a timely and regular basis; (4) Participate and vote in general shareholder 
meetings; (5) Elect members of the board; and (6) Share in the profits of the corporation. 
Assessment: Largely observed 
Description of practice: (1) Secure methods of ownership registration. Virtually all shares are 
issued in registered form in Korea. Registered shares are registered in the Register of 
Shareholders, which is maintained by the company and subject to the examination of 
shareholders and creditors. Possession of share certificates constitute proof of legal ownership. 
Unless registered, a purchaser of registered shares cannot assert her rights against the corporation. 
In listed firms, a growing portion of shares is now deposited with the Korea Securities 
Depository (KSD), the official depository. Such shares are registered in the name of the KSD, 
not the beneficial shareholders. The names of the beneficial shareholders are registered in the 
Register of Beneficial Shareholders prepared by the company based on the information provided 
by the KSD. Registered shareholders are to be regarded as lawful shareholders.  
(2) Convey or transfer shares. The free transferability of shares is regarded as one of the 
fundamental principles of corporate law. The CC recognizes only one exception to this principle: 
a corporation may make a transfer of shares subject to the approval of the board of directors as 
provided for in the articles of incorporation.  
(3) Obtain relevant information on the corporation on a timely and regular basis. 
Shareholders may obtain relevant information through various means under the statutes. First, 
the most basic information on a corporation is available from the Commercial Registry. Second, 
shareholders can examine at any time the articles of incorporation, the minutes of the general 
shareholders’ meetings, the financial statements, business reports, audit reports of the company, 
and the Register of Shareholders. Third, shareholders with 0.1 percent of the shares (3 percent 
for non-listed firms) can inspect the accounting records of the corporation.  
(4) Participate and vote in general shareholder meetings. Shareholders are entitled to attend 
the General Shareholders’ Meeting (GSM). In practice, shareholders’ right to attend the GSM is 
well respected except for a few extreme cases. If a shareholder is somehow denied attendance, 
resolutions passed in the particular GSM may be held invalid by the court. 
(5) Elect members of the board. Directors are to be elected at the GSM by ordinary majority at 
least one-fourth of the total shares represented at the GSM. The SEA now requires outside 
directors to be nominated by an outside director nomination committee, 50 perecent of which 
must be filled with outside directors. Moreover, minority shareholders may put their own 
                                                          
7 Observed means that all essential criteria are generally met without any significant deficiencies. Largely observed means that 
only minor shortcomings are observed, which do not raise any questions about the authorities’ ability and intent to achieve full 
observance in the short term. Partially observed means that while the legal and regulatory framework complies with the OECD 
Principles, practices and enforcement diverge. Materially not observed means that, despite progress, the shortcomings are 
sufficient to raise doubts about the authorities’ ability to achieve observance. Not observed means that no substantive progress 
toward observance has been achieved.  
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candidates for outside directors on the slate prepared by the outside directors nomination 
committee. Cumulative voting was introduced to the CC in 1998. However, more than 80 
percent of the listed firms have now opted out of cumulative voting. Shareholder activitists have 
recommended that cumulative voting be made mandatory.  
Policy recommendation: Consider taking additional steps to allow minority shareholders a 
greater voice in the slection of directors, including making cumulative voting more appealing for 
large listed copmanies. Consider further strengthening the role of the outside directors 
nomination committee by, for instance, requiring that at least two thirds of the members of such 
a committee be independent directors.  
(6) Share in the profits of the corporation. Under the CC, shareholders are entitled to 
dividends in proportion to their shareholdings. It is the GSM, not the board of directors, which 
has the ultimate power to declare dividends under the CC. Although it is quite rare that a 
dividend proposal made by management is defeated in the GSM, management is now under 
strong pressure for more dividends.  
Policy recommendation: Consider conducting further studies and analysis of who should have 
the ultimate power to declare dividends. Consider strengthening the power of the boards of 
directors of public companies under the Securities Transactions Act, which gives them the power 
to declare dividends.  
Principle IB. Shareholders should have the right to participate in, and to be sufficiently informed on, decisions 
concerning fundamental corporate changes, such as: (1) Amendments to the governing documents of the company; 
(2) The authorization of additional shares; (3) Extraordinary transactions that in effect result in the sale of the 
company.  
Asssessment: Observed 
Description of practice: (1) Amendments to the governing documents of the company. 
Revision of the articles of incorporation requires a special resolution of the GSM, which requires 
a two thirds majority of the votes represented at the meeting (this must be not less than one third 
of the total shares). Under the CC, companies are required to notify the shareholders of the 
agenda of GSM two weeks in advance. Under the SEA and the Regulations on Securities 
Issuance and Disclosure, listed companies also are required to provide the shareholders with 
detailed referential materials by each agenda item of the GSM in addition to notification. 
(2) The authorization of additional shares. The authorized shares at the time of incorporation 
are included in the articles of incorporation. The number of shares issued at the time of 
incorporation shall be no less than one-fourth of the number of authorized shares. Within the 
limit of the authorized shares, the board of directors may issue new shares. If the corporation 
wishes to extend the limit, it must change the articles of incorporation, which requires a special 
resolution at the GSM.  
(3) Extraordinary transactions that in effect result in the sale of the company. Under the CC, 
a special resolution is required for a transaction that may result in the sale of the corporation (or a 
substantial part of the corporation). For such transactions involving listed companies, the SEA 
imposes additional disclosure and substantive requirements. 
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Principle IC. Shareholders should have the opportunity to participate effectively and vote in general shareholder 
meetings and should be informed of the rules, including voting procedures, that govern them.  
Assessment: Largely observed 
Decripion of practice: (1) Sufficient and timely information about shareholders’ meeting. 
Under the CC, the corporation must send the notice of a GSM at least 2 weeks prior to the date 
of such a meeting. Such notice may be given electronically now, and it must include the agenda 
of the meeting. The CC does not provide any detailed guidelines for information to be disclosed 
in the notice. The SEA now requires listed companies to disclose any detailed material 
information to the shareholders in addition to the notice as articulated in the Regulations on 
Securities Issuance and Disclosure, etc. Two weeks advance notice may not be long enough for 
foreign institutional investors holding depository receipts, as they need more time to cast votes 
and to obtain clearance internally from compliance officers and global custodians. Investors are 
also required to give voting instructions at least 10 days prior to the meetings. This poses a 
substantial obstacle to anyone who desires to attempt proxy solicitation.8 
Policy recommendation: It is recommended to consider further steps to facilitate voting by 
foreign investors. 
(2) Opportunity to ask questions and place items on the agenda. Although the CC is silent, it 
is generally agreed that individual shareholders are entitled to ask questions to the board 
members at the meeting. It is widely agreed that directors are obliged to answer questions to a 
reasonable extent. Shareholders holding over a certain number of shares - 3 percent for non-
listed companies, 1 percent for listed companies, and 0.5 percent for large listed companies - 
have the right to propose an item for the agenda. But such a request must be made at least 6 
weeks in advance of the proposed GSM. As the notice of the GSM is given only 2 weeks in 
advance, it is difficult, if not impossible, for an individual shareholder to exercise the proposal 
right in an extraordinary GSM. Shareholders holding over 3 percent (1.5 percent for large listed 
companies with capital greater than 100 billion) of the outstanding shares may even convene an 
extraordinary GSM with a court injunction.  
(3) Vote in person or absentia. Shareholders may exercise their voting rights by proxy. If a 
formal proxy solicitation is undertaken, a proxy statement that includes certain information for 
the shareholders is to be provided. In practice, unless there is a dispute with dissenting 
shareholders, firms rarely undertake a formal proxy solicitation. Since 1999, shareholders have 
been permitted to vote by mail, if so provided for in the articles of incorporation. Not many 
companies have adopted this system, however. There is no rule on how votes are cast. The vote 
may be cast by show of hand or by poll, or by any other reasonable method.  
Policy recommendation: It is recommended a mechanism be instituted to further facilitate 
shareholders’ votes by ballot so that this system can be more widely implemented. Shareholders 
should be allowed to cast votes electronically as well.  
Principle ID. Capital structures and arrangements that enable certain shareholders to obtain a degree of control 
disproportionate to their equity ownership should be disclosed. 
Assessment: Largely observed 
                                                          
8 Kim and Kim, “Shareholder Activism in Korea, “ Journal of Korean Law, No. 51, page 60-61. 
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Description of practice: The SEA has provided for the so-called 5 percent rule, which requires 
any person who, with his affiliates, controls 5 percent or more of the total outstanding voting 
shares of a listed firm, to report his holdings to the FSC and the KSE within five days of such an 
acquisition. Under the law, distribution of voting power in Korean firms is quite clear. Under the 
CC, the one share-one vote principle is explicitly stated. Dual class common stock is not allowed, 
with the exception of nonvoting preferred shares.  
Policy recommendation: Consider requiring further disclosure of cash flow rights and voting 
rights of the controlling shareholder, including affiliated corporations, to make it easily 
understandable to the average shareholder. 
Principle IE. Markets for corporate control should be allowed to function in an efficient and transparent manner. 
Assessment: Largely observed 
Description of practice: (1) Clearly articulated and disclosed rules and procedures. The SEA 
provides a set of detailed tender offer rules, which regulate substantive as well as disclosure 
aspects of the tender offer. Currently, a mandatory tender offer rule remains in a limited way. 
Anyone who intends to acquire 5 percent or more of the shares from ten shareholders outside the 
stock market must undertake a formal tender offer. 
(2) No use of anti-takeover devices to shield management from accountability. Anti-takeover 
devices have not been well developed in Korea, largely because controlling shareholders could 
establish a stable control block through pyramiding and cross ownership schemes. Poison pills 
are generally regarded as unavailable in Korea as they are in conflict with the CC.  
Policy recommendation: It is recommended that a study be conducted on how to make the 
market for corporate control work more effectively. 
Principle IF. Shareholders, including institutional investors, should consider the costs and benefits of exercising 
their voting rights. 
Asessment: Partially observed 
Description of practice: As in most other countries, small shareholders in Korea have little 
interest in attending shareholders’ meetings. When they do attend meetings, their impact often is 
insignificant, because a substantial block of the shares is securely in the hands of a few 
controlling shareholders. Even the voices of institutional shareholders have been relatively weak. 
Domestic institutional investors have been either members of chaebol groups or interested in 
maintaining a close business relationship with them. In most cases, foreign investors have been 
either uninterested or unable to overcome administrative difficulties involved in the voting 
process. There are some signs of change, however. Institutional investors such as investment 
trusts and mutual funds are now required to disclose their specific voting intentions prior to the 
GSM. The Fair Trade Act allows affiliated financial institutions to exercise voting rights to a 
certain extent in the shareholder meeting of an affiliated firm. 
Policy recommendation: While progress has been made, domestic institutions are still not well 
aware of the importance of voting in corporate governance. The importance of voting rights of 
beneficiaries and the idea that these rights should be exercised solely in their interest should be 
explicitly made clear in relevant legislation. Further effort should be expended to strengthen the 
institutional investor base through pension system reform to spur capital market development 
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and to place old-age insurance on a sustainable foundation. 
Section II: Equitable Treatment of Shareholders 
Principle IIA. The corporate governance framework should ensure the equitable treatment of all shareholders, 
including minority and foreign shareholders. All shareholders should have the opportunity to obtain effective 
redress for violation of their rights. All shareholders of the same class should be treated equally.  
Assessment: Largely observed 
Description of practice: (1) Legal redress to shareholders if their rights are violated. 
Shareholders may file a derivative action against directors, statutory auditors and controlling 
shareholders. The threshold holding has been reduced from 5 to 1 percent for non-listed firms, 
and as low as 0.01 percent for listed firms. Due to various obstacles, such as a lack of incentive 
on the part of plaintiffs (and lawyers), derivative suits are rarely initiated. Class action lawsuits 
are not available in Korea yet. There is draft legislation in the National Assembly to allow class 
action law suits for limited securities cases. 
Policy recommendation: It is recommended that class action lawsuits be introduced as soon as 
possible to enable shareholders and investors to sue directors, managers, and auditors for 
breaches of duty and violations of the law. 
(2) Same voting rights for shareholders within each class. Under the CC, dual class common 
stock is prohibited. Shares with fractional or multiple votes may not be issued in Korea. Each 
share is given one vote in principle. The only exception is nonvoting preferred shares. Although 
preferred shares may be issued with or without vote, the voting right element should be indicated 
in the articles of incorporation.  
(3) Votes by custodians or nominees in agreement with the beneficial owner. Currently, an 
overwhelming majority of shares of listed firms is deposited with the KSD. As the beneficial 
owner, not the KSD, is explicitly regarded as real shareholder under the SEA, he is entitled to 
vote directly or indirectly by giving instruction to the KSD. If the beneficial owner fails to give 
instruction, the KSD may cast votes in compliance with the so-called shadow voting rule, which 
requires the KSD to vote in proportion to the voting results of other shareholders. In practice, 
there has been no instance where the KSD fails to comply with these voting regulations. Voting 
rights of foreign investors are less perfectly protected. Foreign investors directly holding shares 
in Korea are treated the same as domestic shareholders. Foreign investors holding Depository 
Receipts (DRs) are treated differently in accordance with the deposit agreement. In some cases, 
DR holders are not given an opportunity to express their voting instructions under the contract.  
Policy recommendation: It is recommended that, in order to allow more time for voting, the 
notice period be extended to four weeks, at a minimum, for listed firms.   
(4) Processes and procedures for shareholder’s meetings allow for equitable treatment. 
Shareholders must be treated equally in proportion to their shareholding. Notice must be given to 
each shareholder regardless of his or her shareholding. The SEA allows a listed firm to bypass 
individual notices to shareholders with 1 percent or less by making newspaper announcements.   
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Principle IIB. Insider trading and abusive self-dealing should be prohibited. 
Assessment: Partially observed  
Description of practice: Securities trading based on material non-public information is strictly 
prohibited under the SEA. Violators shall be subject to imprisonment and criminal fine, and may 
be held liable for damages. In addition, the SEA provides for the disgorgement of short-swing 
profits. Any profits gained by a corporate insider of a listed firm through sales and purchases 
executed within six months must be returned to the firm. To help enforce this rule, the SEA 
requires such insiders to report their holdings to the regulatory authorities. The Securities and 
Futures Commission has the responsibility to closely monitor insider trading and market 
manipulation. 
Self-dealing involving directors requires an approval by the board under the CC. Related party 
transactions are widespread in Korea, but since they involve controlling shareholders or more 
often affiliated persons, rather than directors, they are not covered by the CC. Under the SEA 
revised in 2001, a large listed firm is required to get approval of the board and report to the GSM 
for a transaction with the largest shareholder or its affiliate. A rule of similar content is included 
in the Monopoly Regulation and Fair Trade Act. Korea’s Commercial Code already bars 
directors facing potential conflicts of interest from voting in the directors’ meeting. However, 
conflict of interest is narrowly defined and inside directors are often allowed to vote. 
Policy recommendation: It is recommended that further steps be taken to strengthen self-dealing 
and insider trading rules by, for instance, excluding inside directors from decisions that involve 
potential conflicts-of-interest or related party transactions. Another consideration would be to 
impose on the insider the burden of proving fairness of the transaction unless it is approved by 
the outside directors. Additionally, the accounting standard concerning related party transactions 
needs to be improved to be fully consistent with the international accounting standard. 
Principle IIC. Members of the board and managers should be required to disclose any material interests in 
transactions or matters affecting the corporation. 
Assessment: Partially observed 
Description of practice: There is no specific requirement in the CC for disclosure of conflict of 
interest on the part of directors or managers. The only relevant provision under the CC requires 
directors who engage in a transaction with the corporation to obtain approval from the board. As 
directors must seek board approval for certain conflict-of-interest transactions such as self-
dealing, it may be reasonable to presume that the director concerned is obliged to disclose to the 
board the nature of the conflict, just as one may presume that under the CC directors are 
generally required to disclose to the board any potential conflict of interest with the firm. In 
practice, however, such disclosure is not enforced. If the conflict of interest involves a 
controlling shareholder, it is not generally believed that the controlling shareholder has any such 
duty to disclose.  
Policy recommendation: It is recommended that it should be made explicit under the CC that 
directors, controlling shareholders and other related parties are obliged to make a full disclosure 
to the board on the related party transaction in question.  
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Section III: Role of Stakeholders in Corporate Governance 
Principle IIIA. The corporate governance framework should recognize the rights of the stakeholders as established 
by law and encourage active cooperation between corporations and stakeholders in creating wealth, jobs, and the 
sustainability of financially sound enterprises. The corporate governance framework should assure the rights of 
stakeholders that are protected by law are respected. 
Assessment: Partially observed 
Description of practice: In Korea, the corporate governance framework does not explicitly 
address the interests of stakeholders, such as employees and labor unions, suppliers, local 
community, and so forth. Stakeholder related issues such as anti-bribery and anti-corruption 
provisions are specifically addressed in the CC and the Act on the Aggravated Punishment, etc. 
of Specific Economic Crimes, and such crimes are punishable. Creditor interests, however, are 
well respected in various contexts under the CC. The CC and SEA are largely silent on the 
interest of employees, with a notable exception for Employee Stock Ownership (ESOP). In 
practice, management takes the labor interests quite seriously to avoid potential labor unrest. It is 
only recently that management started paying attention to social issues such as environmental 
and anti-discrimination issues.  
Policy recommendation: While there is no consensus on the extent to which stakeholders’ 
interests must be reflected in the corporate governance framework in Korea, there is no question 
that a minimum requirement should be established. It is recommended that further consideration 
be given on how to ensure better representation and protection of the rights of stakeholders. 
Principle IIIB. Where stakeholder interests are protected by law, stakeholders should have the opportunity to 
obtain effective redress for violation of their rights. 
Assessment: Observed 
Description of practice: Employee interests are the ones most explicitly protected by law in 
Korea. Labor statutes provide legal remedies for violation of any of their rights.  
Principle IIIC. The corporate governance framework should permit performance-enhancing mechanisms for 
stakeholder participation. 
Assessment: Largely observed 
Description of practice: Under the SEA, employees of a listed firm are entitled to purchase 
newly issued shares up to 20 percent. This has often turned out to be a profitable option to 
employees, as the new shares are usually issued at a substantial discount. Also, both the CC and 
the SEA now allow firms to grant stock options and stock appreciation rights to their employees. 
It is now becoming common practice among start-up companies to grant stock options to their 
key employees.  
Principle IIID. Where stakeholders participate in the corporate governance process, they should have access to 
relevant information. 
Assessment: Observed 
Description of practice: It is only creditors who are allowed to participate in the corporate 
governance process even to a limited extent. Creditors are given access to such corporate 
information as available from the financial statements, business report, audit report, the articles 
of incorporation, the minutes of the GSM, and the Register of Shareholders. Stakeholder 
participation in the corporate governance process is not widely supported in Korea. 
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Section IV: Disclosure and Transparency 
Principle IVA. The corporate governance framework should ensure that timely and accurate disclosure is made on 
all material matters regarding the corporation, including the financial situation, performance, ownership and 
governance of the company. Disclosure should include, but not be limited to, material information on: (1) The 
financial and operating results of the company; (2) Company objectives; (3) Major share ownership and voting 
rights; (4) Members of the board and key executives, and their remuneration; (5) Material foreseeable risk factors; 
(6) Material issues regarding employees and other stakeholders; and (7) Governance structures and policies.  
Assessment: Largely observed 
Description of practice: (1) The financial and operating results of the company. Under the 
CC, financial statements must be approved by the annual GSM. The balance sheet must be 
published in a daily newspaper upon approval. The business report is prepared mainly for 
delivering non-financial information such as relationship with parent company or subsidiaries, 
information on major shareholders and major creditors, important events occurred after the 
closing of the preceding fiscal year, etc. Directors must submit this business report to the annual 
GSM. Disclosure to the investment community is regulated under the SEA. A listed company 
must submit annual, semi-annual, and quarterly reports to the FSC and the KSE. When a material 
event occurs, listed companies must notify the FSC and the KSE of the event without delay.9 
Failure to comply with this disclosure duty may result in regulatory actions. Directors are held 
liable for damages caused by any misrepresentation.  
Policy recommendation: It is recommended that financial and operating results of companies be 
published with a level of detail consistent with international best practices. 
(2) Company objectives. The CC requires a company to specify the company objectives in the 
articles of incorporation. The objectives must be included in the annual report Change in the 
company objectives must be notified to the FSC and the KSE without delay. 
(3) Major share ownership and voting rights. Share ownership information is available from 
the Register of Shareholders and the Register of Beneficial Owners, both of which are accessible. 
In practice, the Register of Shareholders does not show the full picture because in that register, 
the KSD, the official stock depository, rather than actual shareholders, is normally recorded as 
the largest shareholder. The SEA requires, therefore, that any issuing company or stock transfer 
agent prepare and keep a Register of Beneficial Owners upon receiving a notification of the 
classes and numbers held by the real stakeholders pursuant to the deposited securities from KSD.   
(4) Members of the board and key executives, and their remuneration. The CC requires the 
compensation of directors and statutory auditors to be determined at the GSM. In practice, 
however, the GSM approves of only the cap on compensation of the board members and 
statutory auditors. Disclosure of the remuneration of individual directors is not required.  
(5) Material foreseeable risk factors. No statute prevents a listed firm from disclosing material 
foreseeable risk factors. But no statute specifically requires a listed firm to disclose them either. 
Disclosure of soft information on prospective financial condition or business performance may 
be made under certain conditions.  
                                                          
9 Under the Regulations on the Fair Disclosure, which became effective on Nov. 1, 2002, listed companies must disclose any 
material information publicly when such information is given to a selected group of people. With the introduction of the RFD, the 
protection of investors and the transparency in the Korean securities market are expected to be enhanced. 
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Policy recommendation: It is recommended that listed corporations should be required to 
disclose in the annual reports the level of individual compensation of top management and 
directors at a minimum. It is recommended that the SEA be revised to explicitly require listed 
firms to disclose material foreseeable risk factors in a kind of MD&A attached to annual reports. 
(6) Material issues regarding employees and other stakeholders. The annual report is 
required to cover employee-related matters, such as total number of employees, total wage 
amount, and average wage amount per employee, in the annual report. 
(7) Governance structures and policies. Basic information on directors, including 
representative directors, is available from the corporate registry. Information on governance 
structure must be disclosed through the registration statement and annual report. Disclosure of 
information on governance policies is not required, however.  
Principle IVB. Information should be prepared, audited and disclosed in accordance with high quality standards of 
accounting, financial and non-financial disclosure, and audit. 
Assessment: Partially observed 
There has been significant progress in upgrading accounting and auditing standards and practices 
and strengthening underlying institutions responsible for setting standards and ensuring 
compliance. Accounting standards have been improved significantly and are now largely 
consistent with international standards; the Korean Accounting Standards Board (KASB), an 
independent standard-setting organization, has been established; and auditing standards are now 
fully consistent with international standards. The regulators have also strengthened enforcement 
by imposing sanctions on accountants for violation of rules or laws. While accounting standards 
have been improved significantly, further improvements are required. Quality of accounting, 
financial and non-financial disclosure, and audit is not yet at the level of other OECD countries. 
The level of audit fees in Korea compared to other OECD countries is low, and audit fees are 
determined by management. Non-listed firms are subject to external audit if they have assets 
over 7 billion Won. Although improvements are underway, the quality of accounting disclosure is 
not yet adequate.  
Policy recommendation: It is recommended that further improvement be made to accounting 
standards and auditing practices in a manner consistent with international standards and practices. 
Improvements should include the issuance of operating guidelines, training of accountants, 
enforcement of the Code of Ethics and professional code of conduct for accountants, and 
imposition of sanctions on auditors who violate their duties or professional code, or who commit 
fraud. The quality of accounting, financial and non-financial disclosures, and audit practices need 
to be further improved in order to be at the level of other OECD countries. It is also 
recommended that audit fees be determined by the audit committees rather than the management. 
Principle IVC. An annual audit should be conducted by an independent auditor in order to provide external and 
objective assurance on the way in which financial statements have been prepared and presented. 
Assessment: Largely observed 
Description of practice: Under the Act on External Audit of Corporations (AEAC), a corporation 
with assets totaling seven billion Won must have the financial statements (including consolidated 
or combined financial statements) externally audited by qualified auditors. Auditors are required 
to comply with the auditing standards issued by the Korean Institute of Certified Public 
 11 
 
Accountants (KICPA). Although the MOFE has the formal power to take a disciplinary measure 
against individual CPAs, the SFC plays a more significant role in sanctioning accounting firms as 
well as individual accountants. The KICPA has been planning to adopt a completely revised 
Code of Ethics modeled after the code of professional ethics adopted by the International 
Federation of Accountants (IFAC). This long overdue revised code needs to be adopted as soon 
as possible and put in effect.  
Policy recommendation: It is recommended that a more detailed definition of independence be 
adopted in the AEAC or the CPA Act. An extensive detailed definition is now being prepared for 
inclusion in the new code of professional ethics expected to be adopted by the KICPA in the next 
few months.  
Principle IVD. Channels for disseminating information should provide for fair, timely and cost-efficient access to 
relevant information by users. 
Assessment: Observed 
Description of practice: Under the CC, the financial statements include a balance sheet and an 
income statement, but not a statement of cash flows, which is included in the financial statements 
under the AEAC. Under the CC, only the balance sheet is to be published in a daily newspaper 
upon approval at the GSM. Also, the shareholder may access the financial statements, business 
report, and audit report kept at the principal office.  
Section V: Responsibilities of the Board 
Principle VA. The corporate governance framework should ensure the strategic guidance of the company, the 
effective monitoring of management by the board, and the board’s accountability to the company and the 
shareholders. Board members should act on a fully informed basis, in good faith, with due diligence and care, and 
in the best interests of the company and the shareholders. 
Assessment: Largely observed 
Description of practice: Under the CC, the board should be in charge of the operation of the 
corporation. With a growing number of outside directors participating, the board’s role in large 
listed firms has been substantially strengthened. Under the CC, directors owe fiduciary duties 
(duty of loyalty and duty of care) to the company. Directors who have breached their duties shall 
be jointly and severally liable for damages to the company. Although the CC does not explicitly 
provide the fiduciary duties to individual shareholders, some experts argue that directors owe 
fiduciary duties to individual shareholders as well.  
Policy recommendation: It is recommended that the CC be revised to explicitly require that 
directors owe fiduciary duties to shareholders. 
Principle VB. Where board decisions may affect different shareholder groups differently, the board should treat all 
shareholders fairly. 
Assessment: Partially observed  
Description of practice: Under the CC, management is not allowed to discriminate among 
shareholders of the same class. As long as shareholders are treated equally in a formal sense, 
however, the board is entitled to take any action. For example, the firm may forgo paying 
dividends or undertake a rights offering of substantial size, as those decisions apparently affect 
shareholders equally. Of course, the board is subject to the duty of care, but it is very difficult to 
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attack such decisions of the board on the grounds that they are in violation of the duty of care 
because in most cases the board decision will be respected by the court as business judgment.  
Policy recommendation: It is recommended that the CC explicitly require that the board should 
treat all shareholders fairly. Under such a provision, it will be easier for the shareholders who are 
affected unfairly by a corporate decision to file a suit against management.   
Principle VC. The board should ensure compliance with applicable law and take into account the interests of 
stakeholders.  
Assessment: Partially observed  
Description of practice: It is generally agreed that directors’ duty of care includes a duty to 
comply with applicable laws and regulations. Directors who have violated laws or regulations are 
to be held liable for any damages incurred to the firm. Moreover, the director’s duty of care is 
believed to include a duty to establish a reasonable internal control system for preventing any 
potential violation of law by officers and employees. The Code of Best Practice provides that in 
performing the duties, the director shall always be careful to ensure that no laws are violated by 
the corporation or himself. There is a requirement that companies must establish an internal 
accounting management system and attach to their annual reports an evaluation of their internal 
control system by external auditors. While this requirement partially addresses responsibility of 
various parties in the operation and evaluation of internal control systems, it does not clearly 
distinguish and define the responsibilities of the management (CEO and CFO), boards of 
directors, internal auditors, and external auditors, particularly with regards to compliance with 
applicable laws and regulations. Additionally, implementation of the current requirement does 
not fully meet international standards and best practices.   
Policy recommendation: It is recommended that the scope of current effort to consider 
certification of CEOs by independent auditors be expanded. In doing so, consider requiring 
management (CEOs and CFOs) of large listed companies to include in their annual reports a 
statement on their responsibilities for establishing and maintaining adequate internal controls 
over financial reporting and compliance with applicable laws and regulations, as well as an 
assessment of effectiveness of their internal control system consistent with international best 
practices. Such an assertion should be certified by the external auditor.10 
Principle VD. The board should fulfil certain key functions, including the following: (1) Reviewing and guiding 
corporate strategy, major plans of action, risk policy, annual budgets and business plans; setting performance 
objectives; monitoring implementation and corporate performance; and overseeing major capital expenditures, 
acquisitions and divestitures; (2) Selecting, compensating, monitoring and, when necessary, replacing key 
executives and overseeing succession planning; (3) Reviewing key executive and board remuneration, and ensuring 
a formal and transparent board nomination process; (4) Monitoring and managing potential conflicts of interest of 
management, board members and shareholders, including misuse of corporate assets and abuse in related party 
transactions; (5) Ensuring the integrity of the corporation’s accounting and financial reporting systems, including 
the independent audit, and that appropriate systems of control are in place, in particular, systems for monitoring 
risk, financial control, and compliance with the law; (6) Monitoring the effectiveness of the governance practices 
under which it operates and making changes as needed; and (7) Overseeing the process of disclosure and 
communications.  
                                                          
10 An example of good prcatice is the recent Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 in the U.S. that requires each annual report of an issuer 
to contain an “internal control report.” Each issuer’s auditor needs to attest to and report on the assertion made by the 
management of the issuer. 
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Assessment: Largely observed 
Description of practice: No laws or regulations specify the responsibilities of the board in 
relation to the listed tasks. The CC only provides that the board may decide the business affairs 
of the company and may supervise the management. Thus, unless otherwise provided for in the 
CC or the articles of incorporation, the board has in principle power over all matters of the 
corporation. Large listed companies have been required to establish audit committees of the 
boards of directors. However, the concept is new, and audit committees are generally perceived 
to be neither effective nor adequately equipped to effectively discharge their oversight 
responsibilities. Efforts should continue to improve the effectiveness of audit committees, 
including measures to clarify and strengthen the role and function of audit committees consistent 
with international best practices; replace statutory auditors with audit committees for smaller 
companies over time,11 and upgrade the skills and knowledge of audit committee members. 
Policy recommendation: It is recommended that effectiveness of audit committees be improved, 
including measures to clarify and strengthen the role and function of audit committees, consistent 
with international best practices12. It is recommended that consideration be given to upgrading 
the directors’ training program to a directors’ certification program. It is also recommended that 
consideration be given to making the code mandatory as part of compliance with the listing rules. 
Principle VE. The board should be able to exercise objective judgment on corporate affairs independent, in 
particular, from management. 
Assessment: Partially observed 
Description of practice: (1) Sufficient number of non-executive board members. Prior to the 
financial crisis of 1997, outside directors were very rare in Korea’s corporate community. The 
SEA now requires listed companies to fill at least one quarter of the board with outside directors. 
The statutory minimum is 50 percent (three outside directors at least) for financial institutions 
and large listed companies. Non-listed companies are not required to have outside directors, but 
if they voluntarily establish an audit committee instead of statutory auditors, at least two thirds of 
the committee members shall be outside directors. However, the more important issue is whether 
these outside directors act truly as independent directors.13  This is changing gradually, and 
outside directors in large firms, particularly the ones with foreign investors, are increasingly 
acting independently. 
 
(2) Board members should devote sufficient time to their responsibilities. Directors should 
attend the board meeting. A failure to attend does not bring any disadvantage to the absent 
director under the CC. There is a lower court decision holding that a failure to attend a board 
meeting alone does not constitute a breach of fiduciary duty. Directors now feel more pressure to 
attend board meetings, as listed companies must disclose information on the attendance records 
of directors.  
 
Policy recommendation: In order to ensure that directors act independently of management, 
                                                          
11 Under the SEA, establishment of an audit commiittee is mandatory for listed companies with assets of at least 2 trillion Won. 
As of Decmber 31, 2001 only 12 percent of listed firms had set up an audit commiittee. 
12 Examples of good practices are the Recommendations of the Blue Ribbon Committee on Improving the Effectiveness of 
Corporate Audit Committees and the recent recommendations of the NYSE Listing Committee issued in 2002. 
13 According to a study by the KSE at the end of year 2000, outside directors suuported management in 99.3 percent  of their key 
decisions. About 80 percent of outside directors were nominated by management or the main shareholder, typically the family of 
the chaebol founder. 
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consider further clarifying what constitutes independence and conflicts-of-interest for individual 
directors. 
Principle VF. In order to fulfill their responsibilities, board members should have access to accurate, relevant and 
timely information. 
Assessment: Partially observed  
Description of practice: With the enhancement of related regulations, outside directors of listed 
companies are expected to be informed of BOD meetings four or five days in advance. The Code 
of Best Practice for Corporate Governance sets forth a series of provisions to enable directors to 
gain access to more information. In practice, in a number of listed firms under professional 
management, outside directors are given almost unlimited access to corporate information. 
However, further effort will be required to ensure that individual directors will have adequate 
access to necessary information. 
Policy recommendation: It is recommended that the rights of individual directors, particularly 
independent directors in the SEA, be further expanded and clarified to give them access to all 
corporate information necessary to perform their duties. 
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Annex A: OECD Principles-Assessment Matrix 
Section I: The Rights of Shareholders 
Principle IA. Basic shareholders rights: 
 
(a) Observed                      (b) Largely observed                  (e) Partially observed 
(c) Materially not observed         (d) Not observed   
 
 
Principle IB.  The right to participate in decisions on fundamental corporate changes: 
   
(a) Observed                      (b) Largely observed                  (e) Partially observed 
(c) Materially not observed         (d) Not observed          
 
 
Principle IC.  The right to be adequately informed about, participate and vote in general shareholder meetings 
(AGM): 
       
(a) Observed                      (b) Largely observed                  (e) Partially observed  
(c) Materially not observed         (d) Not observed           
 
 
Principle ID. Disclosure of capital structures and arrangements enabling control disproportionate to equity 
ownership:   
    
(a) Observed                      (b) Largely observed                   (e) Partially observed 
(c) Materially not observed         (d) Not observed           
 
 
Principle IE. Efficient and transparent functioning of market for corporate control: 
   
(a) Observed                      (b) Largely observed                   (e) Partially observed 
(c) Materially not observed         (d) Not observed   
 
 
Principle IF. Requirement to weigh costs/benefits of exercising voting rights 
 
(a) Observed                      (b) Largely observed                   (e) Partially observed 
(c) Materially not observed         (d) Not observed          
 
 
Section II: The Equitable Treatment of Shareholders 
 
Principle IIA. Equal treatment of shareholders within same class  
 
(a) Observed                      (b) Largely observed                  (e) Partially observed 
(c) Materially not observed         (d) Not observed    
 
 
Principle IIB. Prohibition of insider trading and self-dealing   
   
(a) Observed                      (b) Largely observed                   (e) Partially observed 
(c) Materially not observed         (d) Not observed   
 
 
Principle IIC. Disclosure by directors and managers of material interests in transactions or matters affecting the 
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company. 
 
(a) Observed                      (b) Largely observed                   (e) Partially observed 
(c) Materially not observed         (d) Not observed                        
 
 
Section III: The Role of Stakeholders in Corporate Governance 
 
Principle IIIA. Respect of legal stakeholder rights as established by law     
  
(a) Observed                      (b) Largely observed                   (e) Partially observed 
(c) Materially not observed         (d) Not observed   
 
 
Principle IIIB. Redress for violation of rights   
   
(a) Observed                      (b) Largely observed                  (e) Partially observed 
(c) Materially not observed         (d) Not observed   
 
 
Principle IIIC. Performance-enhancing mechanisms for stakeholder participation 
   
(a) Observed                      (b) Largely observed                   (e) Partially observed 
(c) Materially not observed         (d) Not observed   
 
 
Principle IIID. Access to relevant information  
   
(a) Observed                      (b) Largely observed                   (e) Partially observed  
(c) Materially not observed         (d) Not observed           
 
 
Section IV: Disclosure and Transparency 
 
Principle IVA. Timely and accurate disclosure of material information     
 
(a) Observed                      (b) Largely observed      (e) Partially observed 
(c) Materially not observed         (d) Not observed         
 
 
Principe IVB. Preparation of information, audit, and disclosure in accordance with high standards of accounting, 
disclosure and audit.  
 
(a) Observed                      (b) Largely observed                   (e) Partially observed 
(c) Materially not observed         (d) Not observed           
 
 
Principle IVC. Annual audit by independent auditor    
 
(a) Observed                      (b) Largely observed                   (e) Partially observed 
(c) Materially not observed         (d) Not observed            
 
 
Principle IVD. Channels for disseminating information allow for fair, timely, and cost-efficient access to information 
by users  
 
(a) Observed                      (b) Largely observed                   (e) Partially observed 
(c) Materially not observed         (d) Not observed   
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Section V: The Responsibilities of the Board 
 
Principle VA.  Act on an informed basis, in good faith, with due diligence and care, in the best interest of the 
company and shareholders  
 
(a) Observed                      (b) Largely observed                  (e) Partially observed 
(c) Materially not observed         (d) Not observed            
 
 
Principle VB. Fair treatment of each class of shareholders    
 
(a) Observed                      (b) Largely observed                   (e) Partially observed 
(c) Materially not observed         (d) Not observed          
 
 
Principle VC. Compliance with law and taking into account stakeholders’ interests 
 
(a) Observed                      (b) Largely observed                  (e) Partially observed  
(c) Materially not observed         (d) Not observed           
 
 
Principle VD. Fulfillment of key functions, including corporate strategy, selection and monitoring of management, 
remuneration, board nomination, monitoring of conflict of interest including misuse of corporate 
assets and abuse in related party transactions, integrity of accounting, audit, governance practices and 
overseeing disclosure and communication. 
 
(a) Observed                      (b) Largely observed                (e) Partially observed 
(c) Materially not observed         (d) Not observed   
 
 
Principle VE. Objective judgment on corporate affairs, assignment of non-executive directors to tasks of potential 
conflict of interest; devotion of sufficient time. 
   
(a) Observed                      (b) Largely observed                (e) Partially observed 
(c) Materially not observed         (d) Not observed          
 
 
Principle VF. Access to accurate, relevant, and timely information 
 
(a) Observed                      (b) Largely observed                   (e) Partially observed 
(c) Materially not observed         (d) Not observed   
 
 
This table attempts to summarize the current provisions of listed companies in Korea, benchmarked against the OECD 
Principles of Corporate Governance. Each OECD Principle is evaluated based on quantitative and qualitative 
standards. 
 
Observed means that all essential criteria are generally met without any significant deficiencies. Largely observed 
means that only minor shortcomings are observed, which do not raise questions about the authorities’ ability and intent 
to achieve full observance in the short term. Partially observed means that while the legal and regulatory framework 
complies with the OECD Principles, practices and enforcement diverge. Materially not observed means that, despite 
progress, the shortcomings are sufficient to raise doubts about the authorities’ ability to achieve observance. Not 
observed means that no substantive progress toward observance has been achieved.
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Annex B:  Recommended Plan of Key Actions to Improve Observance of OECD 
Principles of Corporate Governance  
 
Since 1998, Korea has laid a solid foundation for good corporate governance. Beyond the changes 
in legislation affecting corporate governance, the Government and the business community should 
take additional steps to: change incentives and further promote transparency of business practices, 
particularly among chaebol groups; to strengthen competition policies in order to expose chaebol 
and firms to stricter market discipline; to increase and enforce shareholder rights; and to improve 
disclosure and monitoring of related party transactions. Moreover, institutional investors, who play 
a key role in corporate governance in many OECD countries, are relatively less important in Korea 
due to the small size of the pension fund sector, an area that needs to be developed, given the rapid 
aging of the population.14 
In order for Korea to deepen its equity market, it needs to build on the excellent progress made and 
continue to improve corporate governance practices in a manner consistent with other OECD 
countries and international best practices. Among the most important measures needed to improve 
such practices are the following: 
 
Recommended Plan of Key Actions to Improve Observance of OECD Principles of Corporate 
Governance 
 
Reference Practice Recommended Action 
I. Rights of Shareholders • Consider taking additional steps to allow minority 
shareholders a greater voice in the selection of 
directors, including making cumulative voting 
more appealing for large listed companies. 
• Consider further steps to facilitate voting by 
foreign investors. 
• Improve the process for nomination of independent 
directors by, for instance, requiring that at least 
two-thirds of members of outside nomination 
committees be independent directors. 
II. Equitable Treatment of Shareholders • Introduce, as soon as possible, class action 
lawsuits by shareholders and investors against 
directors, managers, and auditors for breach of 
duty and violation of the law.15 
• Consider allowing shareholders to cast votes 
electronically. 
• Require that directors, controlling shareholders, 
and other related parties make full disclosure to the 
board on  related party transactions.  
• Consider further steps to strengthen self-dealing 
and insider trading rules, for instance, by 
excluding inside directors from decisions that 
                                                          
14 Financial assets of instutional investors realtive to the size of economy for OECD countries was approximately 140 percent of GDP 
realtive to 60 perecent of GDP in Korea in the year 2000. 
15 While finalizing the draft, the World Bank has been informed by Korean authorities of the following update: Legislation for 
allowing class-action lawsuits for securities violations is now pending at the National Assembly and is scheduled to take effect in 
July 2004. 
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Reference Practice Recommended Action 
involve potential conflict-of-interest or related 
party transactions. 
III. Role of Stakeholders in Corporate 
Governance 
• Strengthen stakeholders’ rights and their protection 
in the corporate governance framework. 
• Promote participation of active institutional 
investors and pension funds in the equity market. 
Further strengthen institutional investor base 
through pension system reform to spur capital 
market development and improved governance.16 
IV. Disclosure and Transparency • Further improve accounting standards and auditing 
practices in a manner consistent with international 
standards and practices.17 
• Further improve quality of disclosure in annual 
and quarterly reports issued by listed companies, 
particularly in areas such as related party 
transactions, conflicts of interest on the part of 
directors and parties related to directors or 
managers, non-financial information, material 
foreseeable risk factors, and compensation of 
individual directors. 
• Consider requiring management (CEOs and CFOs) 
of large listed companies to include in their annual 
reports a statement on their responsibilities for 
establishing and maintaining adequate internal 
controls over financial reporting and compliance 
with applicable laws and regulations as well as an 
assessment of effectiveness of their internal control 
system consistent with international best practices. 
Such an assertion should be certified by external 
auditors.  
• Change the incentives for large chaebol to 
establish holding companies. 
V. Responsibilities of the Board • Continue to improve effectiveness of audit 
committee, including measures to clarify and 
strengthen the role and function of audit 
committees consistent with international best 
practices 
• Replace statutory auditors with audit committees 
for smaller companies over time, and upgrade the 
skills and knowledge of audit committee members. 
• Further strengthen the roles and responsibilities of 
directors, including expanding the fiduciary duty 
of directors and making it explicit under the law 
and limiting liability of independent directors in 
cases in which they have acted in good faith. 
• Upgrade the directors’ training program to a 
                                                          
16 While finalizing the draft, the World Bank has been informed by Korean authorities of the following update: Efforts are underway 
to actively promote participation of institutional investors. 
17 While finalizing the draft, the World Bank has been informed by Korean authorities of the following update: Relevant legislation is 
pending at the National Assembly. 
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Reference Practice Recommended Action 
directors’ certification program, particularly for 
independent directors.  
• Further expand and clarify the right of directors to 
access all corporate information necessary to 
perform their duties. 
• Further clarify what constitutes independence and 
conflicts-of-interest for individual directors. 
 
